Game-theoretic modelling is used to study the design of an agreement among residents to conserve a wildlife resource, by not hunting animals illegally, when the community monitors its own behaviour. The analysis demonstrates that such an agreement may be very much costlier for a government to sustain if its incentive structure avoids the payment of monitoring fees, and instead relies on community bene¢ts for conservation, with bonuses for reporting poachers. Conditions are identi¢ed for the agreement to be stable against both the temptation to avoid monitoring and the temptation to poach, either with guns or by snaring. In particular, the size of the community must exceed a critical value. Implications are discussed for community-based wildlife management programmes in Africa.
INTRODUCTION
Examples abound of grazing lands, water supplies, and other common-property resources being managed successfully over long periods of time by self-governing associations of local users; see, for example, Berkes et al. (1989) and Bromley (1992) . Recently, conservationists have advocated similar schemes through which local communities can manage the wildlife resources in the areas where they live (Child 1996) . Devolving decisionmaking to the local communities is presumed to encourage sustainable resource use, although it is not inevitable; for example, when the Ache¨people of Paraguay were given ownership of their land, they immediately deforested the area (Hill & Hurtado 1996) . Nevertheless, great success has been claimed for one of the ¢rst schemes of this kind, Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) project (Child 1996) .
Prior to the establishment of community-based wildlife management programmes, the authorities have often been especially concerned about local residents poaching, harbouring poachers, or failing to report poaching incidents. A common approach to addressing these concerns has been to employ local villagers as wildlife scouts to enforce the laws, while providing bene¢ts at the community level from income-generating activities. These activities might include legal wildlife harvests, for sale or local consumption of meat, and trophy hunting, providing revenues from licence fees. Schemes vary as to whether they distribute the bene¢ts in kind (as schools or grainprocessing facilities, for example) or as cash payments.
Poaching reduces the level of bene¢ts received by community members by reducing the sustainable level of legal o¡take of the wildlife resources. Community schemes have been shown to be e¡ective in deterring poaching by local people (Lewis et al. 1990 ). For example, local people acting as auxiliary game guards have reduced rhino poaching in Namibia (Loutit & Owen-Smith 1989) .
Most advocates of community-based wildlife management projects emphasize the importance of devolving decision-making as much as possible to the community level (Child 1996 ). Yet, Gibson & Marks (1995) make the important point that a resident's decisions concerning poaching and law enforcement are not dependent solely on community-level bene¢ts from wildlife use. If wildlife is to be conserved in areas where people are living and hunting, rather than just in strictly protected areas, it is important that residents have an incentive to conserve their wildlife. Community-based wildlife management schemes are potentially powerful tools in this regard, but only if they are designed e¡ectively. Now, unlike in protected areas (where there is an asymmetry of role between scout and poacher), in a community-based scheme such as CAMPFIRE, each resident must decide both whether to poach and whether to enforce the law. In other words, there is symmetry with regard to roles. On the one hand, each individual has two ways to cheat: in the role of resident, by poaching, and in the role of potential scout, by electing not to monitor the resource. On the other hand, each individual can instead opt both to monitor the resource and to refrain from poaching. Our goal is to clarify how economic parameters in£uence these potential outcomes. In particular, we seek conditions for mutual enforcement of a conservation agreement to be strategically stable within a community, against the temptation to poach. We approach this issue in terms of game theory. A list of symbols used in our model appears in Appendix A.
Before proceeding, we wish to emphasize that we discuss only the temptation for local residents to poach, and the corresponding requirements for strategic stability of community-based management schemes. Poaching by organized gangs from outside a local area is not amenable to such an analysis, particularly if the gangs are from another country, as was the case when rhinos were poached by Zambians in the CAMPFIRE areas of Zimbabwe (Milliken et al. 1993) . That is not to say that these issues are not signi¢cant. On the contrary, animals with internationally traded, high trophy values are both potentially important to the revenue-generating ability of community management schemes, and particularly vulnerable to external forces. Although local populations may be able to monitor such poaching incursions, they are ill-equipped to deal with the heavily armed and well-organized gangs that target elephants and rhinos (Leader-Williams & Milner-Gulland 1993) . Nevertheless, these issues fall outside the scope of our analysis.
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Let a community consist of n 1 decision-making families or individuals, to whom a government is o¡ering incentives to conserve a wildlife resource. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that incentives are o¡ered in cash, thus ¢nessing the issue of how non-cash bene¢ts can be equitably distributed among deserving individuals. The maximum potential community bene¢t per period for conserving the resource is B. It is paid in full if no individual is hunting illegally, but reduced proportionately to zero as the number of poachers rises from zero to n 1; in any event, it is distributed equally among all individuals. Thus the community`wage' per period to each individual for conserving wildlife when m individuals are poaching is
A choice of hunting technologies is available to residents. For example, in the Luangwa Valley of Zambia, they may either snare surreptitiously or hunt with guns. Before recent increases in law enforcement levels, hunting with guns was preferred. However, recently, snaring has become more prevalent, due to its lower probability of detection (Freehling & Marks 1998) . We use these two technology options as examples of the trade-o¡s a poacher may face, denoting them as`L' for hunting with guns, a long-range technology, and`S' for hunting with snares, a short-range technology.
Let V Z be the expected value of returns per period from using type-Z technology, let D iZ denote the associated probability of being detected if i individuals are monitoring; and let C Z denote the corresponding expected cost per period of a conviction for poaching. Then the expected bene¢t per period to each individual who poaches with type-Z technology, if i individuals are monitoring, is
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that each monitor has a constant probability q Z per period of observing while type-Z technology is used. Thus, the probability that some monitor is observing, i.e. the probability that not all monitors are not observing, is
Because long-range technologies typically have a higher probability of detection (see above), we assume that
It should perhaps be emphasized that C L and C S are expected monetary costs per period, based on an individual's perception of costs of potential outcomes before any o¡ence is committed. Many conditional probabilities could, in principle, in£uence the probability of being convicted, once observed (e.g. conditional probabilities of capture once observed, prosecution once captured, conviction once prosecuted, etc.), and the outcome of a conviction might be a prison sentence; but it is possible to place an expected monetary value on the penalty received. For example, prison sentences can be converted to ¢nes using magistrates' recommended prison sentences for an o¡ender who defaults; see Milner-Gulland & LeaderWilliams (1992) .
The existence of a community wage ensures that the net value of poaching with type-Z technology is less than V Z . When m individuals are poaching, an additional poacher reduces the community wage by W m À W m1 Ba(n 1) 2 . Thus, the net expected value per period of poaching with type-Z technology is
If v L and v S were both negative, then there would be no incentive to poach. The persistence of poaching suggests, however, that one of them is positive, i.e.
Expected returns, V Z , depend not only on the value of captured animals, but also on the numbers taken per period with type-Z technology. Accordingly, it will be convenient to denote the higher value technology by H, regardless of whether H L or H S, and the other technology by O (so that H L implies O S, and vice versa). Then inequality (6) is equivalent to v H 40. We assume that each individual who monitors is paid a scouting fee f by the government. As discussed at the end of the paper, we envisage that this payment would be remuneration for a variety of monitoring duties (e.g. censusing), of which game law enforcement is only one; thus, monitors would have useful work to do, even if no one was breaking the law. We assume that monitors would always report observed violations to the government, for which there would be an additional reward R Z to the ¢rst informant of a type-Z infraction (Jachmann & Billiouw 1997) . Monitoring is not without its costs, however; even if no one is poaching, there is an opportunity cost c 0 associated with the remaining duties. Furthermore, reporting poachers to the government could incur opprobrium, so that expected disutility of monitoring increases with the amount of poaching. We assume that the marginal disutilities with respect to numbers of users of type-L and type-S technology are c L and c S , respectively. Thus, with j type-L poachers and k type-S poachers, the total expected cost of monitoring is c 0 c L j c S k per period. Given that hunters gain social status from providing their lineage dependents with meat and goods exchanged for meat (e.g. Gibson & Marks 1995, p. 943) , c L and c S are probably much larger than c 0 , which is probably very small. Accordingly, we expect
Observing a violation is not the same thing as being rewarded for it, however, because there may be more than one observer, and only the ¢rst to report an o¡ence is assumed to be remunerated. Thus, for a monitoring individual, the probability of obtaining a reward from a speci¢c violation is the probability that the violation is detected multiplied by the conditional probability that the monitor is ¢rst to report it. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all monitors are equally likely to obtain a reward from each violation. Then the reward probability for type-Z technology is D iZ ai, where i is the number of monitors. Note that this quantity is approximately equal to q Z when q Z is small (that is, when there is e¡ectively no competition in the race to report). Combining our results, we ¢nd that the expected bene¢t per period to each monitoring individual, when j other individuals are engaged in type-L poaching, k other individuals are engaged in type-S poaching and i individuals are monitoring, is
We assume that poachers may use either type-L or type-S technology, but not both. Thus, each individual has six possible strategies (see table 1). (We justify restricting the number of strategies to six in the discussion at the end of the paper.)
By analogy with Mesterton-Gibbons (1993 , pp. 1321 , we model the strategic interaction as a symmetric n 1-player game, reduced to an e¡ectively two-player game by supposing that a focal individual interacts with a population consisting of the remaining n individuals, assumed identical. Player 1 is the focal individual, and player 2 is the population. Symmetry implies that the focal individual is arbitrary.
In terms of table 1, a state of large game decimation without law enforcement broadly corresponds to a population norm of LX ; a state of reduced exploitation, in which improved law enforcement induces exploiters to take small game only, broadly corresponds to a population norm of SM; and a state of conservation and law enforcement corresponds broadly to a population norm of NM. In essence, therefore, the thesis of Gibson & Marks (1995) is that the community-based wildlife management scheme operating in the Luangwa Valley, Zambia, has failed to achieve its desideratum of NM, but instead has evolved from a norm of LX in the 1970s and 1980s to a norm of SM in more recent times. The goal of our analysis is to indicate how the desired outcome could yet be attained.
CONDITIONS FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY
A strong (symmetric) Nash equilibrium strategy of such a game is a population strategy that is uniquely the focal individual's best reply to it. Mathematically, this strategy is the restriction to a ¢nite population of the concept of a strong evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS (Maynard Smith 1982) . The ESS analogy is instructive: we can think of the focal individual testing various alternative strategies against the population strategy. If any of these alternatives is a better reply, then other individuals can be expected to copy it, so that it increases in frequency, or`invades'; whereas if none of the alternatives is a better reply, then the focal individual can be expected to conform to the norm of the population. We will refer to a stable population norm as a stable strategy.
The matrix of rewards per period to a focal individual, using a given row strategy against a population using a given column strategy, can now be determined from expressions (1)^(3), (5) and (8), and is shown in table 2. We will denote this matrix A, so that a IJ is the reward to an individual using strategy I against n individuals using strategy J. For example, the reward to strategy NX against population strategy LM is a 61 W n because strategy NX neither poaches nor monitors: the only bene¢t is the community wage, which is W n , because there are n 0 n type-L poachers and no type-S poachers among the n 1 individuals in the entire population. Similarly, the reward to strategy SM against population strategy SX is a 34 W n1 + S 0 + M 0n 1 , which we obtain as follows. First, because there are n 1 type-S poachers when strategy SM confronts n individuals using strategy SX, the community wage is W n1 ( 0). Second, because SX does not monitor and SM does not monitor itself, no one monitors the SMstrategist, so that the expected bene¢t of poaching is S 0 . Finally, the bene¢t from monitoring is M 0n 1 , because the focal individual is the only monitor; and although all n 1 individuals are poaching, the focal individual does not monitor itself. Note that the bene¢ts of monitoring to the focal individual are independent of the number of monitors if no one else is poaching, as indicated by the subscripted dots in columns 5 and 6 of the reward matrix.
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is p JJ 0. The ¢rst two columns of the matrix P are shown in table 3a, the next two columns in table 3b, and the last two columns in table 3c. Some general results emerge at once. First, because lack of vigilance favours poaching. The upshot is that at most two strategies can be stable strategies; and if there are two stable strategies, then one must be a monitoring strategy (LM, SM or NM) while the other must be a nomonitoring strategy (LX or SX). Indeed, if one of these two no-monitoring strategies is stable, then it must be to use the higher-value technology (i.e. strategy HX), for if everyone else were using the lower value technology (i.e. strategy OX) then it would pay to switch. Our purpose, however, is to ¢nd conditions for NM to be stable, which can happen only if p 65 b 0 or
In particular, f must be positive: each individual must be paid to monitor even if no one poaches, or else the agreement is unsustainable. On the other hand, in view of (7), f need not be large to satisfy inequality (11). We assume for the remainder of this section that inequality (11) 
and
(where H denotes the higher-value technology and O the other type); by equation (5), the second inequality is automatically satis¢ed if v O is negative. As remarked above, the only other potentially stable strategy is HX. From table 3a, if H L, i.e. V L b V S , then to exclude the possibility that LX is stable we require p 12 50 or n(c L À q L R L )5f À c 0 ; whereas if H S, then to exclude the possibility that SX is stable we require p 34`0 or n c S À q S R S `f À c 0 . So NM is the only stable strategy if, in addition to inequalities (11) and (12), we have n(c H À q H R H )5f À c 0 .
Ignoring the fanciful circumstance that the marginal disutility of monitoring for a type-H infraction almost exactly balances the probability of observing one times the reward for reporting it (c H À q H R H % 0), the above inequality cannot be satis¢ed for positive c H À q H R H unless either f À c 0 is infeasibly large or n is unreasonably small. In practice, therefore, NM is the only stable strategy if inequalities (11), (12) and
are all satis¢ed. Because 1 À (1 À q H ) n cannot be less than q H (for n51), inequality (12) must be satis¢ed if q H C H aV H b 1. Similarly, inequality (13) 
Note that inequality (16) requires V L 5C L and c H 5R H . Otherwise, the stability of NM depends on group size: for NM to be stable, there is a critical value, say n crit 1, that n 1 must exceed. Suppose, for example, that inequality (16) is satis¢ed and V O aC O 51, but that inequalities (17) are false. Then the e¡ect of BaV O on inequality (13) is negligible (except to the extent of precluding inequality (17)), and so critical group size is well approximated by ensuring that (1 À (1 À q O ) n crit )C O aV O exceeds 1, which yields
where z denotes the integer part of z. Table 4 shows some illustrative values for V O aC O 0.5. The e¡ect of group size is potentially signi¢cant.
IMPLICATIONS
In general, if a strategy is the only stable one, then it will ultimately emerge as the community norm; but if a second strategy is also stable, then the ¢rst will emerge only if it yields a higher community reward. Thus, for a conservation agreement to hold (when v H 40, as we have assumed), either the government must ensure that the nopoaching, monitoring strategy, NM, supporting the agreement is the unique stable strategy; or, if the strategy HX of poaching (with the higher value technology) and not monitoring is also stable, then the government must ensure both that NM is stable and that NM yields a higher community reward than HX. Now, in terms of the reward matrix A de¢ned by table 2, strategy J yields a higher community reward when it yields a higher value of a JJ (i.e. when it yields a higher reward to each individual if the whole population adopts it). So, because NM is the ¢fth strategy in table 1 whereas HX is either the second or fourth, if HX is stable then the government must ensure that a 55 4max(a 22 Y a 44 ) or, on using table 2, that
The higher the value of c H , or the lower the value of R H , the greater the signi¢cance of the above inequality. If the conservation strategy NM is the only stable one, then the relatively high value of R H ac H that guarantees inequality (14) will coerce the community into conserving the resource, and inequality (19) need not hold. If NM is stable but R H ac H is too small to destabilize the anti-conservation strategy HX, however, then the emergence of NM will require the community's voluntary cooperation, which can be induced by the government only if it pays a community bene¢t high enough to make NM yield a higher reward than HX ; or, on rearranging inequality (19), if
Then (n 1)(V H À f c 0 ) is the minimum cost to the government of ensuring that NM has the higher reward. But it also costs the government f per individual, or
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Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (1998) Table 3 . Type-L (a) and type-S (b) technology, and (c) nopoaching columns of the population stability matrix (n 1)f in all, to render NM stable. Including this cost makes (n 1)(V H c 0 ) the total minimum price tag for inducing conservation through community self-monitoring. Suppose, however, that the government neglects to pay the community for monitoring per se. In other words, suppose that f 0. Then although, by inequality (20), NM still yields a higher reward than HX, it is no longer a stable strategy, because p 65 c 0 is negative: if no one is poaching and no one is being paid to monitor, then it pays to switch to not monitoring, thus avoiding the opportunity cost c 0 . But although NX would conserve the resource, it is not a stable strategy. From table 3c, to render it stable requires v H 50, or B4(n 1) 2 V H : when f 0, the minimum price tag for inducing conservation is raised to (n 1) 2 V H . In other words, the minimum cost to the government of an e¡ective community agreement to conserve the resource when f 0 is greater than when f b c 0 by a factor (n 1)V H a (V H c 0 ) . If c 0 is very much less than V H , as suggested by inequalities (7), this factor is approximately n 1. We know of no community for which n 1 would be less than 10. We therefore conclude that an agreement among residents to conserve a wildlife resource through community self-monitoring may be cheaper by at least an order of magnitude for a government to sustain if its community incentive structure separates bene¢ts for not poaching and bonuses for arrests made from payments for monitoring per se. Most community-based wildlife management schemes are expected to be self-sustaining in the long run, through income from activities such as legal hunting and safaris (Child 1996) . In these terms, our analysis suggests that f 0 makes the community's income much less likely to exceed the cost of its management regime, and hence to sustain the agreement.
Previous analyses have ignored the important distinction between the value of an agreement and its strategic stability (Child 1996; Gibson & Marks 1995) : community bene¢ts may strongly in£uence the former, yet have little in£uence on the latter. For example, if Ba(n 1) is very much greater than f À c 0 , then the (individual) value of an agreement to adhere to NM, namely, a 55 f À c 0 Ba(n 1), is dominated by the magnitude of B: f À c 0 has negligible in£uence on it. Nevertheless, as our analysis has clearly shown, the magnitude of B need have no e¡ect on the stability of that agreement, whereas the e¡ect of f À c 0 on the agreement's stability can never be ignored.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, under reasonable assumptions about relative economic magnitudes (see ½ 2), we have identi¢ed constraints for a community-based wildlife conservation programme to be sustainable. Relevant parameters (de¢ned at length in ½ 2, but also listed for ease of reference in Appendix 1) include an opportunity cost c 0 and a fee f for monitoring; detection probabilities q L and q S for hunting with guns and snaring, respectively; and corresponding individual value/cost ratios V L aC L , V S aC S and technology-speci¢c cost/reward ratios c L aR L , c S aR S for poaching and monitoring, respectively. Constraints on these parametersöin particular, that no agreement can be sustainable unless f is positive and exceeds c 0 öare identi¢ed in ½ 3. Their implications for programme design are explored in ½ 4.
Wildlife conservation through community self-monitoring is an example of`by-product mutualism' (Brown 1987) , in which some cooperative behaviouröhere, not poachingöis an incidental consequence of otherwise sel¢sh behaviour. The mechanism that supports byproduct mutualism is a su¤ciently adverse environment, which requires a`boomerang factor'öi.e. any factor that makes non-cooperators su¤ciently likely to victimize themselves (Mesterton-Gibbons & Dugatkin 1992) . Here, the boomerang factor is that intercepted poachers will be ¢ned more than their kill is worth (C H 4V H being a constraint identi¢ed in ½ 3); and the environment is su¤-ciently adverse if monitoring is su¤ciently e¡ective, which depends on both the number of monitoring individuals and the detection probability for each.
Our analysis thus highlights a fundamental distinction between`reciprocal altruism' (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) öin which individuals keep score of pairwise interactionsöand by-product mutualism as the basis for cooperative behaviour. For stable reciprocity among mobile individuals, there is always in principle an upper bound that group size must not exceed; although, if conditions are especially favourable for reciprocity, then this upper bound may lie at in¢nity, and hence be ignorable (Mesterton-Gibbons & Childress 1996) . If, however, conditions for reciprocity are less favourable, then the upper bound is ¢nite and potentially a major constraint, as suggested by Dwyer & Minnegal (1997, p. 105) in the context of sago £our production in a lowland Papua New Guinea community. For stable mutualism, on the other hand, there is always in principle a lower bound that group size n 1 must exceed. If conditions are especially favourable for mutualism, then the critical mass may lie at the lowest possible group size, namely 2, and hence be ignorable; but if conditions for mutualism are less favourable, then the lower bound is at least moderately large and again potentially a key constraint. In the present circumstances, conditions are especially favourable for mutualism only if the detection probabilities are large enough to satisfy both inequalities (16) and (17). Otherwise, the e¡ect of the critical lower bound may be signi¢cant, as illustrated by table 4. Child (1996) has argued that, for a community-based project to work, the community should be small enough to meet under a tree, which he interprets as having no more than 200 households. Thus, table 4 suggests that the the range of sizes at which communities are e¡ective may actually be quite narrow. Gibson & Marks (1995) discuss in qualitative terms why the failure of community-based management programmes to address individual incentives leads to failure to achieve their objectives, in terms of controlling poaching by residents. Here we have shown how important it is to consider not only whether there are su¤cient incentives for residents to stop poaching, but also whether there are su¤cient incentives for them to continue monitoring. No self-monitoring agreement can be sustainable without a payment to each individual that exceeds the opportunity cost of monitoringöeven if no one is poaching. Otherwise, it pays to switch to neither poaching nor monitoring, which is not a stable strategy.
Finally, potential shortcomings of our analysis include our assumptions that monitors would have useful work to be paid for even if no one were breaking the law, and that monitors would always report observed infractions. Nevertheless, with regard to the ¢rst, there is no reason in principle why residents on community-owned lands could not perform monitoring duties similar to those routinely delegated to scouts in the protected areas. For example, Marks (1994) shows how local hunters can participate in population surveys of game species, by recording information such as the time taken to encounter an individual of a particular species, and the area, time of day and season at which animals are encountered. Similarly, LeaderWilliams et al. (1990) demonstrate how data on elephant and rhino population trends can be recorded by professional game scouts during their law enforcement activities. Scouts also routinely record information on signs of poaching activity, which can be used to estimate the general level of poaching activity in an area (LeaderWilliams et al. 1990) . With regard to the second potential shortcoming, if community monitors were organized into teams expected to complete such tasks, as happens with professional game scouts, then there would be fewer opportunities for individuals to cheat by receiving the fee f without actually monitoring. Moreover, a concern that monitors might not always report observed infractions translates into game theory as a concern that the strategy NM of not poaching and monitoring, although stable against each of the other ¢ve strategies in table 1, could perhaps be invaded by a seventh strategy of pretending to monitor and claiming the fee. All games, however, are subject to the rider that stability means stability with respect to a given strategy set (Mesterton-Gibbons 1992, p. 181). Conditions for NM also to be stable against other strategies could not be less stringent than those we have identi¢ed. Thus, even if, strictly, our conditions have limited validity as su¤cient conditions, as necessary conditions their validity is broad. 
